Dynamic privacy management in pervasive sensor networks by Gong, Nan-wei et al.
 1 
Dynamic Privacy Management in Pervasive Sensor 
Networks  
Nan-Wei Gong, Mathew Laibowitz, Joseph A. Paradiso 
Responsive Environments Group, MIT Media Laboratory 
E14-548, 75 Amherst Street, Cambridge 02142, USA   
      {nanwei, mat, joep}@media.mit.edu 
Abstract. This paper describes the design and implementation of a dynamic 
privacy management system aimed at enabling tangible privacy control and 
feedback in a pervasive sensor network. Our work began with the development 
of a potentially invasive sensor network (with high resolution video, audio, and 
motion tracking capabilities) featuring different interactive applications that 
created incentive for accepting this network as an extension of people’s daily 
social space. A user study was then conducted to evaluate several privacy 
management approaches – an active badge system for both online and on-site 
control, on/off power switches for physically disabling the hardware, and touch 
screen input control. Results from a user study indicated that an active badge for 
on-site privacy control is the most preferable method among all provided 
options. We present a set of results that yield insight into the privacy/benefit 
tradeoff from various sensing capabilities in pervasive sensor networks and how 
privacy settings and user behavior relate in these environments. 
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1   Introduction 
As we move into the era of Ambient Intelligence, we will see a shift in how people 
interact with information.  Just as we are now noting users evolve into often using 
mobile devices instead of desktops and laptops, we will see a shift into everywhere 
interaction with pervasive smart environments when sensing, actuation, and display 
are embedded ubiquitously into our surroundings, and our digital “cloud” manifests 
on whatever devices and information portals are available and appropriate.  The user 
interface to this environment will accordingly also be abstracted into a ubiquitous 
sensor network that acts as the perceptive “nervous system” of ambient intelligence.  
The sea of sensors that surround us are already mushrooming, as we bring more and 
more sensing into our presence on the back of devices we acquire for specific 
services.  Once common standards enable applications to share sensor data across 
devices, we will see an explosion of development similar to what happened when the 
Web united networked servers and PCs.  It’s vital, however, that before we reach this 
point, the sensors rushing into in our lives respond intrinsically to our dynamic desires 
for privacy [1,2] – there will just be too many to manually turn off or disable.  
Accordingly, this paper relates a set of studies that we have run at our laboratory to 
determine how users accommodate such a large pervasive multimodal sensor/display 
network and gain insight into how their behavior adapts to a set of dynamic privacy 
protocols that we have developed. 
We began the study of privacy in ubiquitous interactive sensor networks with the 
installation of 45 “Ubiquitous Media Portals” (UMPs) in our building.  This 
potentially invasive sensor network is equipped with high-resolution video, audio and 
motion tracking capabilities. The UMPs ran several applications [2-4] to engage users 
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to interact with those sensing affordances. The video and audio captured by each 
sensor node can be streamed between different nodes for image sharing and message 
broadcasting, as well as to online platforms such as Second Life for ubiquitous 
virtual-reality applications [3]. We also developed several wearable sensors that 
augment this network with on-body sensing to assemble meaningful content, such as 
a user-generated documentary video [4-5].  The displays on each UMP can show 
information of general interest, such as the latest RSS feeds. They also allow users to 
capture and share images or text messages that are broadcast to all the other nodes 
throughout the building. During an 8-month pilot study before we constructed the 
privacy management system, we implemented four different applications to explore 
acceptance by our building-wide users. The results verified that applications allowing 
sufficient, transparent interaction and providing generally useful information are 
effective ways to increase the percentage of nodes remaining active without being 
physically disabled by our users [2]. Learning from this experience, we subsequently 
built a dynamic privacy management system on the UMPs. Our privacy system 
consisted of two parts: onsite privacy control (with beacons from active wearable 
devices, physical switches, and touch screen inputs) and remote privacy settings (via 
web browsers for setting pre-established privacy preferences).  
1.1 Previous Work 
Privacy Protocol Design. Substantial research has been devoted to design strategies 
and policies for privacy issues in ubiquitous computing environments. The major 
approach for controlling privacy status within sensor networks is through constructing 
secure protocols and code verification mechanisms for system developers to follow 
and examine as they deploy the infrastructure for data acquisition and post data 
processing. Bellotti and Sellen were pioneers with their work on privacy in the 
context of ambient video based on the experience of the RAVE media space at 
EuroPARC. They first proposed a privacy-protected framework in 1993 [6] for 
designing ubiquitous computing environments and described the ideal state of affairs 
with respect to each of four types of behavior – Capture, Construction, Accessibility 
and Purposes. Their argument is that providing obvious “feedback and control” over 
information in a ubiquitous computing environment can help assuage privacy 
concerns (Sellen and colleagues have recently demonstrated a system of networked 
cameras and pen-enabled displays for interhousehold interaction in Microsoft’s 
Wayve system [7]).   Drawing upon their work, many toolkits have been developed to 
provide programming support and abstractions for protecting privacy in a ubiquitous 
computing environment such as Confab [8] and Mist [9]. 
 
Context-Aware Systems. Researchers have explored protecting privacy through 
pseudonyms, dummy users, and storing privacy information as a watermark to blur 
users' information, especially location-specific data, in computer vision [10-12, 13]. 
Recently, research into privacy protection in context-aware pervasive systems has 
advanced to the design of self-configuring privacy management infrastructures. 
Ortmann et al. proposed a self-configuring privacy management architecture for 
pervasive systems [14]. Further, Moncrieff and coworkers [15] presented a dynamic 
method for altering the level of privacy in the environment based on inferred context 
and local situation. Beyond research on dynamic privacy configuration that exploits 
fixed sensor infrastructure, the concept of automatically inferring mobile privacy 
settings is also explored through monitoring the use of personal electronic devices 
such as cell phones [16-17]. All of the above examples demonstrate the idea of 
creating a smarter and sophisticated system that could better suit users’ needs of 
privacy within their environment. However, without direct user control, the 
construction of an ideal system that can suit everyone’s needs is almost impossible. 
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Sensing Type and Location Control. Another major method for improving the 
design of privacy protection in sensor networks is through the physical approach — 
the privacy-concious choice of sensors and location/direction of sensing elements. In  
[18], Reynolds and Wren examined the ethical implications of choosing camera 
networks vs. infrared motion detector networks. Their results indicate that for most 
participants, infrared sensors were significantly less invasive than pan-tilt-zoom 
cameras. This comes at the cost, however, of not implanting sensors that can facilitate 
more complex applications.  Although it has been proven that data collected from 
motion sensing can indirectly lead to approximate personnel identification and 
localization [19], the coarse level of interaction provided by a motion sensor network 
still can not yield all functions increasingly desired in evolving ubiquitous networks. 
Therefore, we try not to compromise our sensor system design, but rather to control 
the quality of the data provided according to the dynamic privacy level requested by 
the users’ privacy management settings. 
 
  
Fig. 2.1. System block diagram.  
2  Design and Implementation 
The goal of our system is to construct a user-centric privacy management system 
for ubiquitous computing and use it to obtain real-world experience with a potentially 
invasive pervasive sensor network.   There are two major parts in our privacy 
management system – onsite privacy control and remote privacy settings (Fig 2.1).  
Our sensor network can communicate with the wearable privacy badges through a 
building-wide 802.15.4 ZigBee radio network allowing the badges to change the 
sensing parameters onsite, i.e., turn on or off different sensors according to the 
settings prespecified by each individual badge user (Sec. 2.2). Also, local users can 
physically disable the sensing units through touch screen inputs or an on/off power 
switch. 
 On the other hand, users can set up their privacy preference online from a web 
interface by setting the allowable sensor modalities that can stream from each node 
when they are nearby . Their privacy level can also be dependent on the group status 
of the client browsing the sensor network—the badge user can assign different levels 
of privacy to different groups of people (e.g. taking an analogy to UNIX file system 
permission: “user/group/world”), i.e., individuals who are socially closer to the user 
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can be allowed to have more access. Physical means of providing immediate privacy 
are also afforded (e.g., physically obstructing the sensors and turning the obviously-
located power switch off).  
2.1   Active Privacy Badges and Ubiquitous Media Portals 
In order to provide active control, we designed and implemented active privacy 
badges for the UMPs and demonstrated the possibility of integrating the wearable 
electronics into everyday accessories. Fig 2.2(a) shows the badge we used for our user 
study. This simple wearable sensor has 4 LED indicators to display users’ dynamic 
personal privacy settings, a blocking button for requesting immediate privacy, and a 
vibration motor to alert upon unexpected events, such as a user’s privacy setting being 
over-written by another nearby user with high priority. It communicates with our 
UMP sensor network using 802.15.4, through which we have attained room-level RF 
location accuracy, which is sufficient to disable any UMPs that are in sensing range 
of the badge wearer.  Subsequent badges that we have developed for other projects 
have added a small display (Fig 2.2(b) [7,8]) that can alert people near the user to 
their privacy level or data streaming status.  
 
 Fig. 2.2. (a) Privacy Badge – diagram and worn. (b) Subsequent badge featuring OLED display 
 
The need for a privacy system was inspired by our pervasively-deployed 
multimodal sensor and display Ubiquitous Media Portal (UMP, see figure 2.3) 
network. The 45 UMPs that we built comprise a sensor network that was distributed 
throughout the Media Lab. Each UMP, mounted on a pan/tilt platform, has an array of 
sensors, as well as audio and video capabilities (see Figure 2.3 for the list of features). 
Video and images are acquired with a 3 MegaPixel camera above a touch screen 
display. The video board is driven by a TI DaVinci processor (an ARM9 running 
Linux paired with a C64x+ DSP core for video processing), and features a touch-
screen LCD display, LED floodlight, & speaker. The sensors and an 802.15.4 radio 
that talks to and tracks wearable sensors are mounted on a daughter card, which runs 
an AVR32 microcomputer (AV32UC3A1256) and features stereo microphones, PIR 
motion sensor, humidity/temperature sensor, light sensor, and 2 protocols of IR 
communication (for detecting active badges within the line of sight) [7].  
2.2 Data Server and Web Interface 
For personalized remote privacy control, users can register on the web interface 
with their unique badge ID and edit their privacy preferences on each node. Although 
the work by Beresford and Stajano [13] indicated that in a restricted space, 
pseudonymous ID could be cracked by the location information of each badge, our 
active badge can disable forwarding of tracking information by proximate UMPs if 
the user wants to remain anonymous. 
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Fig. 2.3. Left: (a) Overview of a UMP node and one example application (“Cloud of Images”) 
showing RSS feeds and the last captured image. (b) UMP, in action illuminating subject for 
video capture, and switch for manually deactivating UMP’s power. (c) Sensor daughter board.  
Right: List of features in the sensing system.   
 
Users can edit privacy/sensor preferences on a location basis via a web form. For 
example, in Fig 2.4, the user is editing the behavior of node 311 and turning off the 
video recording when they are present at this location. An “edit all sensors” page was 
also provided to specify globally common settings. Results from how people use this 
page can give us insight into how our system is perceived [20] – e.g., whether specific 
locations or the nature of different sensors is the greatest privacy threat for most 
people. In all of our experiments, the default setting for all sensors was on (making an 
opt-out system). 
  
Fig. 2.4. The “edit sensor” page allows users to click on each node on an interactive map and 
edit sensor settings on a location basis. 
 
One of the most important aspects about users' privacy protection in a ubiquitous 
computing sensor network is having the ability to post-process our personal 
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information flow. While our system has the ability to collect video, audio and images 
and display that information recorded for each user individually, it could also be 
tailored to share users' information with others. In the edit group permission page, the 
users are allowed to reveal their information according to social hierarchy -- user / 
group / world, like a UNIX file permission system (e.g. family, friends, and world in 
real life). Further, users are able to create their own group and send out invitations for 
other users to join their group. This framework can not only allow the users to 
customize how they appear to who is looking, but also can be used as a social 
networking tool similar to Google Tracker, which let you follow your friends’ or 
families’ locations and show ubiquitously-collected images or videos in real-time. 
3   Evaluation 
We conducted several user studies to gain insight into dynamic privacy 
management. The first study included four different applications with different levels 
of control and interaction on the users’ end. Users coulld enable or disable the UMPs 
with the physical power switch onsite. Our results, collected across an 8-month study, 
indicate that applications allowing sufficient, transparent interaction and providing 
generally useful information are effective ways to increase the percentage of nodes 
remaining on. Detailed application and statistics information can be found in [3]. 
With this experience, we conducted another user study that featured our active badge 
system. Users had three different ways to disable sensor streaming— disabling UMPs 
by cutting their power, using the privacy badge’s “NO” button to immediately block 
data transmission, and modifying their online settings to automatically disable sensor 
streaming at specific locations when nearby. The on/off switch will kill the entire 
UMP until it is powered/booted again and rejoins the system (taking many minutes), 
while the privacy button and the online preset behavior only disable the UMPs 
temporarily. In these tests, the default blackout time instigated by the privacy button 
is 10 seconds, which is approximately the typical time needed to walk by a UMP node 
or sufficient time to blank minimal personal identifying information during a 
conversation.  
Twenty-four people (out of 90 people working on the same floor where all portals 
were installed) volunteered to participate in this weeklong study. The recruitment 
requirements [20] include selecting people whose offices are located near the UMPs 
and obtaining a diverse group of people, including students, staff and faculty 
members in our building (65% had engineering/science background – the remainder 
had background in arts, humanities, or other expertise).  All were well aware of the 
privacy threats that our system posed, and knew that video/audio could be streamed 
from each portal. 
3.1 User Study Results 
Results from Active Badge Usage. Fig. 3.1 (left) shows the normalized 
distribution of on-site “NO” button presses versus time. The users generally press the 
NO button on their badge when there is a conflict between the location-specified 
privacy of their online settings and the location of an unexpected private event, or 
when unquestioned privacy is immediately needed. During our one-week user study, 
the average number of button presses per day was 71; 3 button presses per user per 
day. The peak correlates with afternoon break / lunch (2-3 PM) with broad tail late 
into the afternoon when more social interaction is typically exercised and users tend 
to desire more confidentiality.  
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Fig. 3.1.  Left: Ratio of NO button presses per the number of users (error bars are derived from 
the number of people per bin). Right: Normalized histogram of disabled UMPs over time (the 
average fraction of disabled UMPs is 8%) 
 
Although we built the active badge system to solve the privacy issue for dynamic 
situations, gaining a balance between maintaining the full function of a ubiquitous 
interactive sensor network while preserving users’ privacy in every way is still an 
unsolved issue. Figure 3.1 (right) shows the average fraction of disabled UMP units 
from both button presses and automatic shuttering (determined by user proximity to 
the UMP and their web-assigned preferences) per 10-minute interval.  We see up to 
20% of the units disabled by privacy requests at peak social intervals. 
 
Results from Users’ Online Settings. From the web database, we observed that 70 
percent of participants set up their privacy preferences online and 66 percent of all 
participants chose to block all video transmission through active badge proximity (50 
percent set all audio off), whereas only 34 percent set all motion sensors off. As for 
the privacy settings on individual nodes, 50 percent of all participants set up 
individual privacy on a location basis. On their daily route, 33 percent turned off the 
video recording/broadcasting, another 17 percent disabled both video and audio, but 
merely 4 percent disabled the motion sensors. The remaining 8 percent did not set up 
preferences from this page, and just used their on-badge button. 
Figure 3.2 explores the relationship between different privacy management 
methods versus the location of individual UMP units. This plot is segmented 
according to the location of each UMP. Nodes in group A are in the corners and 
hallways where people pass by, generally with less social interaction. These nodes are 
on most of our users’ routing path; however, less people set up intrinsic privacy 
control there online. Group B are nodes in common areas such as our café and 
kitchen, where most social interactions take place – accordingly, these places 
encountered both significant online scripted blocking and spontaneous button presses.  
The last group, C, are nodes located in office clusters and around intersections 
between different paths. Fewer users marked those places as high privacy risks online, 
but lots of unexpected private events happened as we can see from the high 
percentage of privacy button presses. 
Results from Questionnaire and Interview. After the evaluation period, each user 
was asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire that asked about the usability 
of this system and the acceptance of each privacy protection method. When users 
were asked about which approaches could better suit their need for privacy control, 
40% answered “online privacy settings”, 33% answered “on-site badge control” and 
another 19% and 8% answered “button on the touch screen” and “cutoff switch” 
respectively.  
We also interviewed the users and ask them to list the scenarios in which they used 
the active badge system for privacy incidents. 75 percent of users listed “to block 
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audio recording from an unexpected private conversation”; 50 percent listed “to block 
the video recording”. One interesting finding is that, among the users who listed 
“video blocking” as one of their rationales, some mentioned that they prefer not to be 
recorded when they are alone in a public area, such as in front of the elevator or in the 
kitchen. This result supports the idea that privacy is a dynamic factor and cannot be 
generalized easily.  
Also, 21 percent indicated that they pressed the NO button to block location 
tracking occasionally. Though it is possible to block all sensor data collection, many 
people decided to keep the motion/location tracking on and block the more invasive 
signals via the privacy badge – these people tried to create a participatory “location 
presence” in front of their colleagues. On the other hand, 12.5 percent of users never 
used the badge and commented that they didn’t care about being recorded or tracked 
in their workspace. This indicated that it is impossible to define a standard privacy 
scenario. Only a personalized system with dynamic controlling capabilities can 
provide a privacy-enhanced ubiquitous media environment. Our active badge system 
satisfied this for most of our users. 
 Fig. 3.2. Relationship between privacy management methods versus individual UMP location.  
The “Routing Information” shows how much of the user’s specified daily route through the 
buiding passes near that portal – “Button Presses” are the recorded NO events at that location, 
and the last quantity shows the percentage of people who chose online to disable that portal 
when they were nearby. 
 
4  Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we presented multiple approaches for personal privacy management in 
ubiquitous sensor networks. The major contribution to privacy research in ubiquitous 
computing environments is providing a user-centric privacy-protected platform and 
obtaining experiences with the deployment of a potentially invasive sensor network.  
We have evaluated the usability of an active privacy badge system and the possibility 
of using this system as a building-wide privacy protection facility. Our results 
indicated that an active badge system for privacy control is the most acceptable 
method among all the tested options (disabling data transmission from an active 
badge system, on/off switches, or the touch screen displays). The results from these 
tests also suggested that if occupants of moderately denser buildings block data 
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transmission in their vicinity at the rates we see now, the availability of the sensor 
network will be compromised. Therefore, it is crucial to find a balance between 
protecting privacy and maintaining enough data flow for the value-added applications 
utilizing the network at the same time. Ongoing research by various teams (e.g., [21]) 
is exploring ways of removing particular individuals from audio/video and sensor 
streams when privacy is desired, maintaining network function.  Our future work will 
explore this avenue, as well as integrating our privacy badge functionality into 
commodity cell phones and common short-range radio standards like Bluetooth. 
This project focused more on interfaces for privacy management and control 
rather than network security – the protocols and systems that we used were minimally 
secured, which wouldn’t be permissible in an actual deployment. For this type of 
system to be really used, trusted, and ultimately accepted, communication protocols, 
software, and hardware need to be implemented that are secure and resistant to attack 
[22] so that security and privacy can be certifiably protected according to individual 
choice.  More detailed information is available, including all the collected data, higher 
resolution images, source code, and schematics, in the associated graduate thesis [20].   
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